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“For whoever wishes to save his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life 
for my sake will find it. What profit would there be for one to gain the 
whole world and forfeit his life?”1 
I. Introduction 
Charles Dickens’s A Christmas Carol stands through time as one 
of the classic stories of the Christmas season. As the story begins, 
Ebenezer Scrooge encounters the ghost of his deceased partner, Ja-
cob Marley, whose body was draped with the chain of “cash-boxes, 
keys, padlocks, ledgers, deeds, and heavy purses wrought in steel.”2 
As his ghostly encounter with Marley came to a close, Ebenezer 
Scrooge approached the window of his bedroom where he encoun-
tered the ghosts of usurers, the ghosts “moaning as they went” and all 
wearing chains such as the ghost of Jacob Marley wore.3 After his en-
counters with Jacob Marley, the ghosts of usurers, and the ghosts of 
Christmas past, present, and future, Ebenezer Scrooge resolved to 
disavow his prior life of monetary consumption without compassion 
or justice as well as his usurious ways.4 The Christmas spirit trans-
formed him. 
 
 1. Matthew 16:25–26 (New American). 
 2. Charles Dickens, A Christmas Carol 30 (Margaret K. McElderry 1995) (1843). 
 3. Id. at 39. Dickens describes the scene with the “ghosts of usurers” as follows: 
The air was filled with phantoms, wandering hither and thither in restless haste, and 
moaning as they went. Every one of them wore chains like Marley’s Ghost; some few 
(they might be guilty governments) were linked together; none were free. Many had 
been personally known to Scrooge in their lives. He had been quite familiar with one 
old ghost, in a white waistcoat, with a monstrous iron safe attached to its ankle, who 
cried piteously at being unable to assist a wretched woman with an infant, whom it 
saw below upon a doorstep. The misery with them all was, clearly, that they sought 
to interfere, for good, in human matters, and had lost the power forever. 
Id. at 39–40. 
 4. Id. at 88. Dickens described Ebenezer Scrooge’s transformation as follows: 
Scrooge was better than his word. He did it all, and infinitely more; and to Tiny 
Tim, who did not die, he was a second father. He became as good a friend, as good a 
master, and as good a man, as the good old city knew, or another other good old city, 
town, or borough, in the good old world. Some people laughed to see the alteration 
in him, but he let them laugh, and little heeded them. For he was wise enough to 
know that nothing ever happened on this globe, for good, at which some people did 
not have their fill of laughter in the outset; and knowing that such as these would be 
blind anyway, he thought it quite as well that they should wrinkle up their eyes in 
grins as have the malady in less attractive forms. His own heart laughed, and that was 
quite enough for him. 
Id. at 143–44. 
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Decades later, Gordon Gekko rose to prominence in the movie 
Wall Street as a corporate raider and insider trader.5 In his infamous 
speech before the stockholders of Teldar Paper, Gekko stated, 
“Greed, for lack of a better word, is good. Greed is right.”6 But is 
greed truly good? 
The issue of greed and avarice in society is certainly not unique 
to the realm of literature and film; it is an all too significant issue in 
today’s complex world. Some financial products and financial 
schemes, like the Ponzi scheme,7 have been present since the time of 
Charles Dickens but are all too familiar in contemporary news sto-
ries. Bernard Madoff, a former chairman of the NASDAQ stock 
market, pled guilty in 2009 of defrauding investors of approximately 
$64.8 billion in a Ponzi scheme of epic proportions.8 The “real-estate 
bubble” and fraud in the real estate market in the early 2000s, with 
subprime loans being bundled into AAA-rated securities, threatened 
the structure of the entire American economy.9 In insurance, the life-
 
 5. Wall Street (20th Century Fox 1987). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Thomas R. Cox, Robert J. Morad & Clarence L. Pozza, Jr., A Review of Recent Inves-
tor Issues in the Madoff, Stanford and Forte Ponzi Scheme Cases, 10 J. Bus. & Sec. L. 113, 116 
(2010) (“A Ponzi scheme is a deception in which a person or entity (‘Ponzi schemer’) solicits 
and receives money (or its equivalent) from certain investors which the Ponzi schemer pays out 
to other investors in order to create a misperception of returns on the investment and/or return 
of the principal invested.”). 
 8. Felicia Smith, Madoff Ponzi Scheme Exposes “The Myth of the Sophisticated Investor,” 
40 U. Balt. L. Rev. 215, 218–19 (2010) (“In 2009, Bernard L. Madoff (Madoff), a former 
Chairman of the NASDAQ Stock Market and principal of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Secu-
rities, LLC, pled guilty to defrauding investors of an estimated $64.8 billion (an estimate that 
included gains from apparently bogus ‘investment returns’). Among Madoff’s investors were 
hedge fund managers, charities, pension funds, retirees, celebrities, and self-described ‘average 
Americans.’ Those with the greatest exposure to Madoff had invested amounts ranging from 
millions to billions of dollars.”). 
 9. See John E. Campbell & Oliver Beatty, Huch v. Charter Communications, Inc.: Con-
sumer Prey, Corporate Predators, and a Call for the Death of the Voluntary Payment Doctrine Defense, 
46 Val. U. L. Rev. 501, 524 (2012). Campbell and Beatty describe the fraud in the real-estate 
market and securitization of subprime loans as follows: 
The fraud in the subprime market was almost too pervasive to recount. While Wall 
Street companies invented derivatives and figured out ways to turn bundles of sub-
prime loans into AAA rated securities, consumers were in the cross-hairs at the 
ground level. Perpetrators committed an almost endless string of frauds to fuel Wall 
Street’s need for more subprime paper. Appraisers over-appraised homes; talking 
heads promised a housing market that would never decline; “liars loans” in which no 
documents are required to get a loan became the norm; pre-payment penalties were 
imbedded in almost every loan; adjustable rates that could only go up (exploding 
ARMS) were buried in fine print, and companies like Countrywide and Ameriquest 
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settlement industry has helped fuel the rise of stranger-originated life 
insurance, in which life insurance is not purchased as an estate-
planning tool but rather as a financial benefit.10 And the practice of 
payday lending, in which a consumer may be potentially exposed to 
unsecured loans with APRs of 300% to 1000%,11 although regulated, 
still exists in many states.12 
One financial practice still exists today that occurred in biblical 
times—the practice of usury. Historically, usury was referred to as 
the lending of money with any interest.13 In the contemporary legal 
environment, usury laws are laws that establish a maximum rate of 
lawful interest for which a lender and borrower of money may con-
tract.14 At the time of the founding of the United States, each of the 
original thirteen colonies had laws in effect that capped the simple 
nominal annual interest rate at no more than 8%.15 Today, however, 
state usury laws have been curtailed,16 and the principle of lex specialis 
derogat legi generali17 applies toward commercial transactions such as 
 
sponsored Super Bowls and other events while building a true house of cards 
grounded upon subprime loans. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 10. Susan Lorde Martin, Betting on the Lives of Strangers: Life Settlements, STOLI and Se-
curitization, 13 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 173, 187 (2010) (“The business of life settlements has evolved 
from having investors purchase existing life insurance policies from insureds who no longer 
need the insurance to protect their families in the event of their deaths, to an arrangement in 
which a life insurance agent or a life settlement broker persuades a senior citizen (preferably 
one with a net worth of at least $5 million) to take out a life insurance policy, not for the pur-
pose of protecting his or her family, but for a current financial benefit.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 11. Michelle Hodson et al., An Update on Emerging Issues in Banking: Payday Lending, 
FDIC.gov (Jan. 29, 2003), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2003/012903fyi.html. 
 12. Blake T. Williams, The Dimensions of the Shark Tank: The Appropriate Regulation of 
Payday Lending in South Carolina, 62 S.C. L. Rev. 623, 629 (2011). 
 13. Black’s Law Dictionary 1685 (9th ed. 2009). 
 14. Richard A. Mann & Barry S. Roberts, Smith & Roberson’s Business Law 234 
(15th ed. 2012). 
 15. Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Sali-
ence Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1110, 1117 (2008) (“While 
the thirteen original American states were divided on many legal issues . . . they unanimously 
adopted usury laws capping interest rates. Early American usury laws were all written in clear 
terms, specifying a maximum simple nominal annual interest rate.”). 
 16. Mann & Roberts, supra note 14, at 234 (“Though, historically, every State had a 
usury law, a recent trend has been to limit or relax usury statutes.”). 
 17. Laura M. Olson, Practical Challenges of Implementing the Complementarity Between In-
ternational Humanitarian and Human Rights Law—Demonstrated by the Procedural Regulation of 
Internment in Non-International Armed Conflict, 40 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 437, 446 (2009) 
(“Lex specialis derogat legi generali is a tool of interpretation and conflict resolution. When 
 185] A Catholic Perspective on Modern Usury 
 189 
payday loans and title loans since specific state statutes regulating 
these transactions prevail in conflicts of interpretation over a statute 
of general applicability, such as a state usury law. 
In the wake of the decline of state usury laws, consumers today 
may face annual credit card interest rates of 20% to 30%, or perhaps 
even more.18 Payday loan consumers may face annual rates of 300% 
to 1000%.19 Certainly, the “Founding Fathers” of the United States 
would cringe at the modern thought of annual interest rates on any 
type of loan being 1000% or more. 
Could any interest rate that high ever be considered just? There 
are many perspectives in the debate over usury laws from those in the 
financial industry, consumer advocates, and of course, political lead-
ers. In an influential article in the May 2004 issue of First Things, the 
noted Catholic writer George Weigel strongly argued for the rele-
vance of Catholic international-relations theory in the realm of con-
temporary foreign affairs, and suggested that the Catholic tradition 
offers three key insights on moral responsibility—an understanding 
of power, the universal common good, and peace.20 The Catholic le-
gal tradition offers significant contributions in other areas as well, in-
cluding commercial law. 
As in to the realm of foreign affairs, the Catholic legal tradition 
offers key insights into the realm of justice, usury, and contract.21 A 
 
applied narrowly, it is employed only ‘to resolve a genuine conflict between two norms,’ thus, 
‘in the event of conflict, the more special norm prevails over the more general norm.’” (cita-
tions omitted)). 
 18. Kathy Chu & Byron Acohido, Why Banks Are Boosting Credit Card Interest Rates and 
Fees, USA Today (Nov. 14, 2008, 3:00 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/bank 
ing/2008-11-09-bank-credit-card-interest-rates_N.htm. 
 19. Hodson et al., supra note 11. 
 20. George Weigel, World Order: What Catholics Forgot, First Things, May 2004, at 31, 
31–32. 
 21. See Daniel K. Finn, The Unjust Contract: A Moral Evaluation, in The True Wealth 
of Nations: Catholic Social Thought and Economic Life 143, 147 (Daniel K. Finn ed., 
2010). Finn notes that there are three separate types of justice in the classic Catholic view: 
commutative, distributive, and general. He explains each as follows: 
  Commutative justice orders the relation of individuals to one another as indi-
viduals, and in this sense it is the most intuitively obvious form of justice for most 
people today. If I borrow something from you, I have an obligation to return it; if 
you enter into a contract to do something for me, you have an obligation to do it. 
Distributive justice relates to the proper order between the community and its indi-
vidual members. In distributive justice the person or persons charged with responsi-
bility for the community must render to each citizen that which is due. General or 
legal justice concerns the relation of the individual member to the social whole. This 
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Catholic view of justice requires that parties to a contract are not 
merely negotiating to obtain the most advantageous terms, but are 
parties situated in a larger community who have responsibilities to 
work toward the universal common good.22 Pope Benedict XVI’s 
2009 encyclical Caritas in Veritate reaffirms these obligations, but also 
strongly emphasizes the necessity and duty in today’s economic world 
for all to safeguard the weaker, vulnerable parties in business and so-
ciety.23 The duty to safeguard the weak and vulnerable in society 
manifests itself prominently in Catholic social teaching and the pref-
erential option for the poor.24 
 
dimension of justice identifies the obligation of each person to contribute to the 
community, often described as a contribution to the common good. 
Id. 
 22. Vincent D. Rougeau, Just Contracts and Catholic Social Teaching: A Perspective from 
Anglo-American Law, in The True Wealth of Nations, supra note 21, at 117, 136. 
 23. Pope Benedict XVI, Encyclical Letter, Caritas in Veritate, at para. 65 (June 29, 2009) 
[hereinafter Caritas in Veritate], available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/enc 
yclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-verita te_en.html. 
For a comprehensive and detailed discussion of the role of Caritas in Veritate and modern 
economic and legal thought, see John M. Breen, Love, Truth, and the Economy: A Reflection on 
Benedict XVI’s Caritas in Veritate, 33 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 987 (2010). 
 24. Catholic social teaching and the “preferential option for the poor” are two key con-
cepts in modern Catholic thought. Catholic social teaching is described by the United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops in the following terms: 
Catholic social teaching is a central and essential element of our faith. Its roots are in 
the Hebrew prophets who announced God’s special love for the poor and called 
God’s people to a covenant of love and justice. It is a teaching founded on the life 
and words of Jesus Christ, who came “to bring glad tidings to the poor . . . liberty to 
captives . . . recovery of sight to the blind,” and who identified himself with “the least 
of these,” the hungry and the stranger. Catholic social teaching is built on a com-
mitment to the poor. This commitment arises from our experiences of Christ in the 
eucharist. 
Catholic Social Teaching, U.S. Conf. Cath. Bishops, http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-
teachings/what-we-believe/catholic-social-teaching (last visited Jan. 19, 2013) (citations omit-
ted). 
The preferential “option for the poor” implies “the obligation to evaluate social and 
economic activity from the viewpoint of the poor and the powerless.” This obliga-
tion arises from the radical command to love one’s neighbor as one’s self. The prime 
purpose of this special commitment to the poor is to enable them to become active 
participants in the life of society. It is to enable all persons to share in and contribute 
to the common good. 
Marvin L. Krier Mich, The Challenge And Spirituality Of Catholic Social Teach-
ing 125 (2011). See generally Pope Benedict XVI, Encyclical Letter, Deus Caritas Est (Dec. 25, 
2005) [hereinafter Deus Caritas Est], available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ bene-
dict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-caritas-est_en.html.  
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In today’s economic world, just as it has done in the past, the 
practice of usury often threatens the most weak and vulnerable in so-
ciety. Unlike the past, in today’s world commercial transactions have 
become global, complex, and sophisticated. Caritas in Veritate and the 
writings of Pope Benedict XVI address the contemporary role of the 
Catholic legal tradition in the modern economic world and call for 
capitalism, finance, and economics to lead not only to improved 
wealth creation, but also development of financial institutions where 
“the humanitarian dimension predominates” and usury is eliminat-
ed.25 
In this Article, we contend that the Catholic legal tradition is rel-
evant in the usury debate, just as it is in foreign affairs, as a universal 
ethical participant to the discussion concerning modern commercial 
transactions. The Catholic legal tradition is relevant as it presents a 
challenge to the “greed is good, greed is right” philosophy of the fic-
tional Gordon Gekko.26 While the Catholic legal tradition has his-
torically disallowed usury, the parameters of what constitutes usury in 
Catholic thought have shifted from the biblical era to modernity. 
Sections II, III, and IV of this Article discuss this transformation and 
where usury stands in contemporary Catholic legal thought. 
Sections V, VI, and VII of this Article discuss the status of usury 
laws today and how contemporary Catholic legal thought contributes 
to the debate over usury laws in modern commercial transactions in 
two distinct situations—payday lending and title-loan lending. 
We contend that the purposes and intention of the Catholic legal 
tradition in the usury debate can be upheld by vigorous enforcement 
and adherence to the unconscionability doctrine of contract law.27 
 
  As the years went by and the Church spread further afield, the exercise of chari-
ty became established as one of her essential activities, along with the administration 
of the sacraments and the proclamation of the word: love for widows and orphans, 
prisoners, and the sick and needy of every kind, is as essential to her as the ministry 
of the sacraments and preaching of the Gospel. 
Id. at para. 22. 
 25. Caritas in Veritate, supra note 23. 
 26. Flavia Krause-Jackson, Vatican Slams ‘Greed is Good’ Wall Street Mantra (Update2), 
Bloomberg (Jul. 28, 2009, 9:57 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsar 
chive&sid=aQl9pmfRaeAQ (noting that Vatican Secretary of State Tarcisio Bertone stated that 
the “greed market has substituted free market” in a speech before Italian legislators). 
 27. Frank P. Darr, Unconscionability and Price Fairness, 30 Hous. L. Rev. 1819, 1820 
(1994) (“Substantive unconscionability looks to the fairness of the term being challenged. Pro-
cedural unconscionability addresses the fairness of the contracting process. Generally, courts 
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The duty to safeguard the weak and vulnerable parties in business in 
today’s economic environment, as expressed by the writings of Pope 
Benedict XVI, can be better upheld by careful application of the un-
conscionability doctrine in cases involving payday loans and title 
loans. 
In addition, in the spirit of Pope Benedict XVI’s encyclical Cari-
tas in Veritate, we maintain that the essence of the Catholic legal tra-
dition offers two strong economic alternatives to usury in today’s 
economic environment—community credit unions and microcredit 
lending programs. 
II. Biblical Injunctions Against Usury 
The Christian and Hebrew Bibles contain numerous prohibitions 
against usury. The Old Testament contains the following injunctions: 
If you lend money to one of your poor neighbors among my people, 
you shall not act like an extortioner toward him by demanding in-
terest from him;28 
Do not exact interest from your countryman either in money or in 
kind, but out of fear of God let him live with you;29 
You are to lend him neither money at interest nor food at a profit;30 
You shall not demand interest from your countrymen on a loan of 
money or of food or of anything else on which interest is usually 
demanded;31 
You may demand interest from a foreigner, but not from your 
countryman, so that the LORD, your God, may bless you in all your 
undertakings on the land you are to enter and occupy;32 
After some deliberation, I called the nobles and magistrates to ac-
count, saying to them, “You are exacting interest from your own 
kinsmen!”;33 
 
require the party asserting the unconscionability defense to show both substantive and proce-
dural unconscionability.”). 
 28. Exodus 22:24. 
 29. Leviticus 25:36. 
 30. Id. at 37. 
 31. Deuteronomy 23:20. 
 32. Id. at 21. 
 33. Nehemiah 5:7. 
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I myself, my kinsmen, and my attendants have lent the people mon-
ey and grain without charge. Let us put an end to this usury! I ask 
that you return to them this very day their fields, their vineyards, 
their olive groves, and their houses, together with the interest on 
the money, the grain, the wine, and the oil you have lent them;34 
Who keeps an oath despite the cost, lends no money at interest, ac-
cepts no bribe against the innocent. Whoever acts like this shall 
never be shaken;35 
He who increases his wealth by interest and overcharge gathers it 
for him who is kind to the poor;36 
Layman and priest alike, servant and master, The maid as her mis-
tress, the buyer as the seller, The lender as the borrower, the credi-
tor as the debtor;37 
Woe to me, mother, that you gave me birth! A man of strife and 
contention to all the land! I neither borrow nor lend, yet all curse 
me;38 
If he does not lend at interest nor exact usury; if he holds off from 
evildoing, judges fairly between a man and his opponent; if he lives 
by my statutes and is careful to observe my ordinances, that man is 
virtuous—he shall surely live, says the Lord GOD;39 
But if he begets a son who is a thief, a murderer, or who does any of 
these things (though the father does none of them), a son who eats 
on the mountains, defiles the wife of his neighbor, oppresses the 
poor and needy, commits robbery, does not give back a pledge, rais-
es his eyes to idols, does abominable things, lends at interest and ex-
acts usury—this son certainly shall not live. Because he practiced all 
these abominations, he shall surely die; his death shall be his own 
fault;40 
On the other hand, if a man begets a son who, seeing all the sins his 
father commits, yet fears and does not imitate him; a son who does 
not eat on the mountains, or raise his eyes to the idols of the house 
of Israel, or defile his neighbor’s wife; who does not oppress any-
 
 34. Id. at 10–11. 
 35. Psalms 15:5. 
 36. Proverbs 28:8. 
 37. Isaiah 24:2. 
 38. Jeremiah 15:10. 
 39. Ezekiel 18:8–9. 
 40. Id. at 10–13. 
 BYU Journal of Public Law   [Vol. 27 
194 
one, or exact a pledge, or commit robbery; who gives his food to the 
hungry and clothes the naked; who holds off from evildoing, accepts 
no interest or usury, but keeps my ordinances and lives by my stat-
utes—this one shall not die for the sins of his father, but shall surely 
live;41 and, 
There are those in you who take bribes to shed blood. You exact in-
terest and usury; you despoil your neighbors violently; and me you 
have forgotten, says the Lord GOD.42 
While the New Testament does not contain an absolute prohibi-
tion against usury, there is a reference to interest in the Parable of the 
Talents, also known as the Parable of the Ten Gold Coins.43 The third 
servant publicly rebukes his Master upon his return as follows: 
Then the other servant came and said, “Sir, here is your gold coin; I 
kept it stored away in a handkerchief, for I was afraid of you, be-
cause you are a demanding person; you take up what you did not lay 
down and you harvest what you did not plant.44 
The Master replied to the third servant: 
With your own words I shall condemn you, you wicked servant. 
You knew I was a demanding person, taking up what I did not lay 
down and harvesting what I did not plant; why did you not put my 
money in a bank? Then on my return I would have collected it with 
interest.45 
Noted theologian William R. Herzog II interprets the Parable of 
the Talents as the absentee landlord punishing the third servant for 
publicly criticizing his master as a demanding person—a person who 
takes up what he did not lay down and harvests what he did not 
plant.46 
Clearly, the Old Testament prohibits the use of usury. Despite 
this clear prohibition, the definition of what particular financial prac-
tices constituted “usury” remained a matter of some debate among 
early Catholic theologians. Catholic doctrine concerning the charg-
 
 41. Id. at 18:14–17. 
 42. Id. at 22:12. 
 43. Luke 19:11–26. 
 44. Id. at 20–21. 
 45. Id. at 22–23. 
 46. William R. Herzog II, Parables as Subversive Speech: Jesus as Pedagogue of 
the Oppressed 154–55 (1994). 
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ing of interest on loans would evolve as the global economy was 
transformed with the rise of capitalism, commercial lending, and 
merchant banks. 
III. Development of Catholic Thought 
Concerning Usury 
The early biblical injunctions against usury found expression in 
several of the foundational documents of the Church. The Council of 
Nicaea, the first ecumenical council of the Church, was held in AD 
32547 and promulgated the Nicene Creed to mainly counteract the 
heresy of Arianism.48 While the Council was held primarily to ad-
dress the Arianism controversy, the Council prohibited clergy from 
lending money at any interest in Canon 17.49 While clergy were pro-
hibited from lending any money with interest, it is important to note 
that the text of Canon 17 did not apply to the laity in general.50 
An influential commentator on the history of usury, Judge John 
T. Noonan, Jr. observed that in the early Medieval period, from AD 
750 to 1050, a general prohibition against usury began to take a firm 
hold in the law of the lands of the Holy Roman Empire.51 Noonan 
also remarked that during this time, usury was referred to in church 
documents as a form of avarice or uncharitableness rather than as a 
sin against justice.52 Two major church councils in the twelfth centu-
ry also strongly condemned usury as a violation of both human and 
divine law, as well as a violation of justice. The Second Lateran 
Council in AD 1139 branded usurers as “infamous” and required that 
 
 47. The First Council of Nicaea, New Advent, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11044 
a.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2013). 
 48. Arianism, New Advent, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01707c.htm (last visited 
Jan. 7, 2013). 
 49. First Council of Nicaea, Canon 17, in 1 Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils 14 
(Norman P. Tanner, ed., 1990). The text of the canon states: 
Since many enrolled [among the clergy] have been induced by greed and avarice to 
forget the sacred text, “who does not put out his money at interest,” and to charge 
one per cent [a month] on loans, this holy and great synod judges that if any are 
found after this decision to receive interest by contract or to transact the business in 
any other way or to charge [a flat rate of] fifty per cent or in general to devise any 
other contrivance for the sake of dishonourable gain, they shall be deposed from the 
clergy and their names struck from the roll. 
Id. (alteration in original) (footnote omitted). 
 50. Id. 
 51. John T. Noonan, Jr., The Scholastic Analysis of Usury 16 (1957). 
 52. Id. at 17. 
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any infamous usurer be denied a Christian burial unless they repent-
ed.53 Forty years later, in AD 1179, the Third Lateran Council reaf-
firmed medieval teaching on usury to date and even referred to the 
practice of usury as a “crime.”54  
Several years later, during his papacy (AD 1185–1187), Pope Ur-
ban III cited the divine prohibition on usury55 contained in Luke 6: 
34–35.56 Noonan contends that this development began a period of 
time where medieval Catholic thought prohibited the gain of any in-
terest on a loan, where only gratuitous loans were permissible.57 
Saint Thomas Aquinas, one of the greatest scholars of the Scho-
lastic period,58 considered usury as profit on a loan,59 and the scho-
 
 53. 1 Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, supra note 49, at 200. The text of Can-
on 13 states: 
  Furthermore, we condemn that practice accounted despicable and blameworthy 
by divine and human laws, denounced by Scripture in the old and new Testaments, 
namely, the ferocious greed of usurers; and we sever them from every comfort of the 
church, forbidding any archbishop or bishop, or an abbot of any order whatever or 
anyone in clerical orders, to dare to receive usurers, unless they do so with extreme 
caution; but let them be held infamous throughout their whole lives and, unless they 
repent, be deprived of a christian burial. 
Id. 
 54. Id. at 223. The text of Canon 25 states: 
  Nearly everywhere the crime of usury has become so firmly rooted that many, 
omitting other business, practise usury as if it were permitted, and in no way observe 
how it is forbidden in both the Old and New Testament. We therefore declare that 
notorious usurers should not be admitted to communion of the altar or receive chris-
tian burial if they die in this sin. Whoever receives them or gives them christian bur-
ial should be compelled to give back what he has received, and let him remain sus-
pended from the performance of his office until he has made satisfaction according 
to the judgment of his own bishop. 
Id. 
 55. Noonan, supra note 51, at 19–20 (“In a letter which becomes the decretal Consuluit, 
[Urban III] cites the words of Christ, ‘Lend freely, hoping nothing thereby’ The immense im-
portance of this citation can hardly be exaggerated. Here, for the first time in the entire tradi-
tion, a specific command of Christ is authoritatively interpreted by a pope as prohibiting usu-
ry.” (citation omitted)). 
 56. Luke 6:34–35 (“If you lend money to those from whom you expect repayment, what 
credit [is] that to you? Even sinners lend to sinners, and get back the same amount. But rather, 
love your enemies and do good to them, and lend expecting nothing back; then your reward 
will be great and you will be children of the Most High, for he himself is kind to the ungrateful 
and the wicked.” (alteration in original)). 
 57. Noonan, supra note 51, at 20. 
 58. See, e.g., New Advent, Scholasticism, in Catholic Encyclopedia (The Catholic En-
cyclopedia on CD-ROM, 2009), available at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/13548a.htm 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
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lastic scholars affirmed the doctrine that a loan had to be made with 
the intention that no money beyond the sum loaned would be re-
ceived in return.60 Noonan remarks that until the sixteenth century, 
the medieval Church’s position on usury was that the intention to 
gain a profit from lending was sinful.61 
However, the rise of capitalism prior to and during the Renais-
sance period not only led to a rebirth in cultural antiquity, but also 
the birth of a new commercial era of increased economic growth and 
production of goods and services.62 The term “commercial revolu-
tion” has been utilized by scholars63 to describe the period from the 
tenth century through the Renaissance of increased agricultural 
productivity, emerging regional markets, and growth of industry.64 
This period also saw the emergence of Italian cities (such as Flor-
 
 59. Noonan, supra note 51, at 53. Thomas Aquinas writes: 
  In those things whose use is their consumption, the use is not other than the 
thing itself; whence to whomever is conceded the use of such things, is conceded the 
ownership of those things, and conversely. When therefore, someone lends money 
under this agreement that the money be integrally restored to him, and further for 
the use of the money wishes to have a definite price, it is manifest that he sells sepa-
rately the use of the money and the very substance of money. The use of money, 
however, as it is said, is not other than its substance: whence either he sells that 
which is not, or he sells the same thing twice, to wit, the money itself, whose use is 
its consumption; and this is manifestly against the nature of natural justice. 
Id. at 53–54 (quoting Thomas Aquinas, De Malo, Q.13 art. 4c). 
 60. Noonan, supra note 51, at 33. 
 61. Id. at 20. 
 62. Harry Miskimin, The Economy of Later Renaissance Europe, 1460–1600, at 
46 (1977). 
 63. See, e.g., Richard Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence 3 
(2009) (“The intensification and expansion of Italian trading activity throughout the Mediter-
ranean and western Europe has given rise to the rubric ‘commercial revolution’ to cover the 
period of early trade-led growth of the European economy, from the tenth to the fourteenth 
century.”). 
 64. Id. at 5–6 (“In exchange for what they bought in the Levant, western merchants had 
to sell what they could obtain from the relatively backward economy of Europe, mostly raw 
materials such as furs, timber, metals, and slaves but also agricultural products and, increasingly, 
some manufactured goods made from these raw materials, such as arms and, especially, wool 
cloth. The quantity of these bulky, low-priced goods needed to balance the luxury imports from 
the East, however, was immense, and the considerable labor and organizational input required 
to produce them and get them to distant markets was a major stimulus to economic growth and 
development in all the major sectors, from agriculture in Italy to the textile industry in the Low 
Countries, from maritime shipping and commerce in Venice, Genoa, and Pisa to international 
banking in Lucca, Siena, and Florence.”). 
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ence) as major international centers of commerce, banking, and gov-
ernment finance.65 
Along with the overall rise of capitalism and commerce came new 
methods of lending in banking. The rise of commercial activity led to 
the development of practices that came into tension with, if not ex-
plicitly violated, the usury doctrine.66 Bills of exchange67 were devel-
oped to make transactions easier for merchants who would otherwise 
be required to haul bullion or other valuables to a distant city in or-
der to purchase goods.68 Over time, bills of exchange were trans-
 
 65. Id. at 37 (“The strength of Florence in international commerce and finance was in its 
network abroad. Firms were scattered all about the western Mediterranean and northern Eu-
rope, in hinterland towns as well as the major ports of trade, and although they were autono-
mous businesses, these firms worked through one another and thus tied themselves into a com-
prehensive international network that was more extensive than that of merchants of any other 
city down to the sixteenth century. Throughout their network Florentines operated in three 
spheres: commerce, banking, and, to isolate one aspect of banking that took its own distinct 
course, government finance. These spheres were interdependent, with commerce being the 
principal dynamic that drove the system, since activity in the other spheres arose from efforts to 
utilize favorable balances and to direct payments through the network. Banking was largely an 
extension of commerce, given the merchant’s involvement in international exchange and trans-
fer.”). 
 66. Id. at 410 (“[A] problem inherent in the history of banking during this period is the 
constraint imposed on economic activity by the usury doctrine, which subjected the extension 
of credit to moral imperatives. Thirteenth-century notarial contracts for loans never mention 
interest, whereas contemporaneous accounts are usually explicit about it. But beginning in the 
early fourteenth century the usury restriction began to raise problems about the charging of 
interest. The growth of the economy and the development of instruments for utilizing capital 
for business enterprises generated practices that patently went against the doctrine and by the 
same token aroused a more vigorous defense of the doctrine.”). 
 67. See Kurt Eggert, Held up in Due Course: Codification and the Victory of Form over Intent 
in Negotiable Instrument Law, 35 Creighton L. Rev. 363, 378–79 (2005) (“Most commonly 
during their early use, bills of exchange had four parties. The original maker of the bill (the 
‘payer’), who wished to pay a sum of money to the intended recipient of the money (the ‘ulti-
mate recipient’ or ‘payee’), would pay that sum of money to a third party (the ‘drawer’ of the 
bill), often a local exchanger, who would draw a bill for that amount. The bill was made out as 
an instruction to a fourth party (the ‘drawee’), often an exchanger near the ultimate recipient, to 
pay to the ultimate recipient the set sum of money. Then the payer could send the payee the 
bill, the payee would take the bill to the drawee, and the drawee would, if he accepted the bill, 
pay the sum of money to the payee. Later, the drawee and drawer had to settle up, most likely 
in the course of settling a multitude of debts among many parties, some debts going one way, 
some the other.” (footnote omitted)). 
 68. Id. at 377–78 (“Bills of exchange were developed to solve a basic problem, how to 
transport capital from one place to another or from one country to another, without having to 
undertake the dangerous task of hauling bullion or other valuables, risking theft. The most 
basic example of this use is that of a merchant who wished to travel to a distant city and buy 
goods without having to carry the money needed for the purchase.”). 
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formed into a principal instrument by which a merchant could make 
money on the credit extended69 and, thus, evade the Catholic 
Church’s proscription of loans that directly charged interest.70 In ad-
dition, pawnbroking became more prevalent to provide the lower 
economic classes in society access to short-term credit.71 Some indi-
viduals opened pawn banks, in which loans were extended in ex-
change for the security of a pawn, while interest rates of twenty to 
thirty percent were charged to the borrower.72 Furthermore, some 
bankers even covered up interest charges on their books, recording 
the amount the borrower owed when the loan was due and not the 
amount actually received by the banker.73 Finally, one scholar has 
even, controversially, suggested that the presence of the Catholic sac-
rament of penance and purgatory relieved entrepreneurs’ anxiety 
concerning the morality of commercial practices of the time.74 To 
stay in divine favor, the banker could also conceivably purchase pri-
vate chapels and make charitable donations to welfare and religious 
institutions.75 
The rise of commercial activity before and during the Renais-
sance period led to a reformulation of official Catholic doctrine and 
to the formulation of a distinction between a theory of usury and 
theory of interest.76 During the Renaissance period, most theologians 
gradually accepted the right of a creditor to obtain interest from the 
beginning of a loan in a situation where the borrower was in perpetu-
al delay in repayment of the loan.77 Changes in the very nature of 
commercial institutions also led to revisions in usury theory in the 
Catholic tradition. Noncharitable lending institutions had to find 
money in order to pay for their services and for the salaries of their 
employees, and the charging of interest on loans gradually became 
accepted by theologians.78 In addition, theologians also started to ac-
cept the belief that a title to interest was theologically permissible to 
 
 69. Goldthwaite, supra note 63, at 217. 
 70. Id. at 217–18. 
 71. Id. at 419. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 411. 
 74. Id. at 584. 
 75. Id. at 584–85. 
 76. Noonan, supra note 51, at 100. 
 77. Id. at 132. 
 78. Id. at 309–10. 
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a lender because of the inherent risk of lending, as expenses are typi-
cally incurred directly and indirectly by the loan.79 
All of these new developments in commerce were considered by 
the Fifth Lateran Council of 1515. The Fifth Lateran Council for-
mally defined usury as “when, from its use, a thing which produces 
nothing is applied to the acquiring of gain and profit without any 
work, any expense or any risk.”80 Thus, usury was not defined as tak-
ing interest on a loan, but rather the acquiring of gain and profit in 
the situation where one did not undertake any effort or incur any ex-
pense or risk. Since most banks and commercial entities undertook 
some amount of risk in lending money in the era of Renaissance 
commerce, this development largely legitimized the lending of mon-
ey with interest in Catholic teaching. 
In 1745, Pope Benedict XIV formally enunciated the permissibil-
ity of charging lawful interest on loans in the papal encyclical Vix 
Pervenit: 
[E]ntirely just and legitimate reasons arise to demand something 
over and above the amount due on the contract. Nor is it denied 
that it is very often possible for someone, by means of contracts dif-
fering entirely from loans, to spend and invest money legitimately 
either to provide oneself with an annual income or to engage in le-
gitimate trade and business. From these types of contracts honest 
gain may be made.81 
The fact that official Catholic doctrine permitted the charging of 
interest on loans did not give all lenders carte blanche to charge ex-
cessive rates of interest. In Vix Pervenit, Pope Benedict XIV placed 
the constraints of equality, justice, and fairness on lending with inter-
est.82 “In essence, only contracts with interest that were made in the 
 
 79. Id. at 361. 
 80. Fifth Lateran Council, Session 10, 4 May 1515, On the Reform of Credit Organisations, 
in 1 Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, supra note 49, at 625–26. 
 81. Pope Benedict XIV, Encyclical Letter, Vix Pervenit, at para. 3-III (Nov. 1, 1745) 
[hereinafter Vix Pervenit], available at http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Ben14/b14vixpe.htm.  
 82. Id. at para. 3-IV (“[I]f equality is not maintained, whatever is received over and above 
what is fair is a real injustice. Even though it may not fall under the precise rubric of usury 
(since all reciprocity, both open and hidden, is absent), restitution is obligated.”). 
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spirit of upholding the common good avoided the usury prohibi-
tion.”83 
Through the eighteenth century to the present age, numerous 
advances in commerce and technology have been made. The com-
plexity of financial instruments in the commercial realm today, par-
ticularly in lending, often challenges the key tenets of Catholic teach-
ing concerning usury. The shift in Catholic doctrine concerning 
usury, and the resulting emphasis on justice, fairness, and equity con-
cerning interest in the loan transaction, animates much of contempo-
rary Catholic thought concerning the modern economy. 
III. Usury, the Modern Economy, and Contemporary 
Catholic Thought 
His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI espoused his view concerning 
the contemporary responsibilities of individuals to work towards a 
more humane, just, and peaceful world in his 2006 book Values in a 
Time of Upheaval.84 Then-Cardinal Ratzinger wrote: 
 In the generation to which I belong, the dimension beyond 
death and of eternal life has been pushed to the margins, even in the 
Church’s preaching. The suspicion that Christians neglect life here 
on earth because they constantly dream only of the life to come, 
came to infect believing Christians themselves, including those who 
preached God’s Word. We were told that Christians shared only 
half-heartedly in constructing the world, which could have been 
better and more humane long ago if only Christians had not prac-
ticed “flight from the world.” Eternity can wait. The task now is to 
make the world a better place to live. 
 Well, these ideologies have not made it better and more hu-
mane. It is precisely the one who spends his days exercising respon-
sibility for eternal life who gives these days their full weight. We see 
this in the parable of the talents: the Lord does not summons us to a 
comfortable existence but to trade with our talents. It is also true 
that one who is aware of eternal life is liberated from the rapacious 
greed that wants to enjoy everything to the full here and now, since 
he knows that the present age is the time for work and the great 
feast comes afterwards. The fields of death before which we stand 
 
 83. Id. (“If everything is done correctly and weighed in the scales of justice, these same 
legitimate contracts suffice to provide a standard and a principle for engaging in commerce and 
fruitful business for the common good”). 
 84. Joseph Ratzinger, Values in a Time of Upheaval (Brian McNeil, trans., 2006). 
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admonish us to remember death and to lead our life aright in the 
face of eternity.85 
In this passage, Pope Benedict calls for individuals to eschew the 
philosophy that people need only be concerned with their own indi-
vidual works in the world without worry about the world beyond the 
present time. Instead, he calls for individuals to conduct their work in 
recognition of the world to come. Such remembrance of eternal life, 
according to the Pope, liberates individuals from the excesses of 
greed and avarice that have become all too common in today’s eco-
nomic world. 
However, the contemporary call of Pope Benedict for individuals 
to be cognizant of the eternal world to come does not abdicate the 
affirmative duty of persons to continue to make efforts to create an 
atmosphere for the true and just development of all peoples. The key 
Catholic document today that animates the response of Catholicism 
to the modern economic world is Pope Benedict XVI’s 2009 encycli-
cal Caritas in Veritate. The Pope stated the following with regard to 
the responsibility of individuals and financial entities in today’s mod-
ern economy: 
 Finance, therefore—through the renewed structures and operat-
ing methods that have to be designed after its misuse, which 
wreaked such havoc on the real economy—now needs to go back to 
being an instrument directed towards improved wealth creation and 
development. Insofar as they are instruments, the entire economy 
and finance, not just certain sectors, must be used in an ethical way 
so as to create suitable conditions for human development and for 
the development of peoples. It is certainly useful, and in some cir-
cumstances imperative, to launch financial initiatives in which the 
humanitarian dimension predominates. However, this must not ob-
scure the fact that the entire financial system has to be aimed at sus-
taining true development. Above all, the intention to do good must 
not be considered incompatible with the effective capacity to pro-
duce goods. Financiers must rediscover the genuinely ethical foun-
dation of their activity, so as not to abuse the sophisticated instru-
ments which can serve to betray the interests of savers. Right 
intention, transparency, and the search for positive results are mu-
tually compatible and must never be detached from one another. If 
love is wise, it can find ways of working in accordance with provi-
 
 85. Id. at 118–19 (citation omitted). 
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dent and just expediency, as is illustrated in a significant way by 
much of the experience with credit unions. 
 Both the regulation of the financial sector, so as to safeguard 
weaker parties and discourage scandalous speculation, and experi-
mentation with new forms of finance, designed to support devel-
opment projects, are positive experiences that should be further ex-
plored and encouraged, highlighting the responsibility of the 
investor. Furthermore, the experience of micro-finance, which has 
its roots in the thinking and activity of the civil humanists—I am 
thinking especially of the birth of pawnbroking—should be 
strengthened and fine-tuned. This is all the more necessary in these 
days when financial difficulties can become severe for many of the 
more vulnerable sectors of the population, who should be protected 
from the risk of usury and from despair. The weakest members of 
society should be helped to defend themselves against usury, just as 
poor peoples should be helped to derive real benefit from micro-
credit, in order to discourage the exploitation that is possible in 
these two areas. Since rich countries are also experiencing new 
forms of poverty, micro-finance can give practical assistance by 
launching new initiatives and opening up new sectors for the benefit 
of the weaker elements in society, even at a time of general eco-
nomic downturn.86 
Several themes animate these two critical paragraphs of Caritas in 
Veritate. First, in today’s modern economic world, regulation of the 
financial industry is essential to protect the weakest and most vulner-
able in society. It is, in essence, a reaffirmation of contemporary 
Catholic teaching of the preferential option for the poor, which dic-
tates that the greatest of care must be taken for the most vulnerable 
in society.87 Archbishop Oscar Romero, one of the great Catholic 
theologians and martyrs of the twentieth century, discussed the pref-
erential option for the poor in the following terms: 
The world of the poor teaches us about what the nature of Chris-
tian love is, a love that certainly seeks peace, but also unmasks false 
pacifism—the pacifism of resignation and inactivity. It is a love that 
should certainly be freely offered, but that seeks to be effective in 
history. The world of the poor teaches us that the sublimity of 
Christian love ought to be mediated through the overriding necessi-
ty of justice for the majority. It ought not to turn away from honor-
 
 86. Caritas in Veritate, supra note 23, at para. 65 (emphasis omitted). 
 87. Deus Caritas Est, supra note 24. 
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able conflict. The world of the poor teaches us that liberation will 
arrive only when the poor are not simply on the receiving end of 
handouts from governments or from the church, but when they 
themselves are the masters of, and protagonists in, their own strug-
gle and liberation . . . .88 
Furthermore, the Pope also significantly recognized in Caritas in 
Veritate the positive potential of community credit unions and micro-
finance programs to combat usury and the exploitation of the most 
vulnerable in today’s society.89 Such programs have the potential for 
the weakest and most vulnerable in society to become, in the words 
of Archbishop Romero, “masters” and “protagonists” of their own 
stories.90 Finally, reaffirming centuries of Catholic tradition, usury 
was strongly condemned as exploitation.91 
As discussed further below in Section VIII, community credit un-
ions and microlending programs are effective moral economic alter-
natives to modern usury. Despite the strong historical aversion to 
usury among many in the United States, payday loans and title loans 
pose a great contemporary challenge as modern forms of usury. 
IV. Background of State Usury Laws 
Criticism of excessive interest rates did not come only from the 
realm of theologians—the prohibition against usury was also firmly 
embedded in the common law. The Statute of Anne, a law which 
dates back to 1710 England, capped the permissible annual nominal 
interest rate at no more than 5%.92 Each of the original thirteen col-
onies capped the annual nominal interest rate at 8%.93 Historically, 
every state has had a usury law in place.94 That is still generally the 
case today, as most states place a limitation on the maximum interest 
rate that can be charged on a general loan. As Table 1 (Appendix) il-
lustrates, states vary widely with regard to the maximum annual rate 
of usury—ranging from 5% in Iowa and Wisconsin to 24% in the 
 
 88. Oscar Romero, Voice of the Voiceless: The Four Pastoral Letters and 
Other Statements 184 (Michael J. Walsh, trans., 1985). 
 89. Caritas in Veritate, supra note 23, at para. 65. 
 90. Romero, supra note 88. 
 91. Caritas in Veritate, supra note 23, at para. 65. 
 92. Peterson, supra note 15, at 1116. 
 93. Id. at 1117–18. 
 94. Mann & Roberts, supra note 14. 
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District of Columbia.95 Some states have no general usury limit, in-
cluding Idaho, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and South 
Dakota.96 If a violation of a usury statute occurs, states vary in treat-
ing the violation, some states may void the entire underlying con-
tract,97 and others render the contract voidable only to the extent the 
interest is specified beyond the lawful rate.98 
The United States Supreme Court, however, delivered a blow to 
the strength of state usury laws with its decision in Marquette National 
Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp. in 1978.99 In Marquette National 
Bank, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the Na-
tional Bank Act allowed a national bank based in one state to charge 
its out-of-state credit card customers a higher rate on unpaid credit 
card balances than the out-of-state customers would be charged by a 
national bank based in their home state.100 In the case, a Nebraska-
based bank’s subsidiary issued credit cards in Minnesota, which 
charged rates on unpaid balances in excess of Minnesota’s usury 
laws.101 The Supreme Court held that the National Bank Act permit-
ted the charging of the higher interest rate.102 
Significantly, the Court rejected the argument of the Minnesota-
chartered national banking association that the “exportation” of in-
terest rates would impair a state’s ability to enforce its domestic usury 
statute.103 In fact, the Court contended that the impairment of a 
state’s ability to enforce a usury statute had “always been implicit” 
with the National Bank Act, “since citizens of one State were free to 
visit a neighboring State to receive credit at foreign interest rates.”104 
The effects of Marquette National Bank were wide and far-
reaching. One scholar has described it as the “gunshot starting a 
frenzied race-to-the-bottom in American usury law.”105  
 
 95. See infra Table 1 (Appendix). 
 96. Id. 
 97. John Edward Murray, Jr., Murray on Contracts 592 (5th ed. 2011). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 
(1978). 
 100. Id. at 301. 
 101. Id. at 299. 
 102. Id. at 301. 
 103. Id. at 318. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Peterson, supra note 15, at 1121. 
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Banks essentially were left to largely ignore state usury caps with 
credit cards as state usury laws were preempted. In 1996, in Smiley v. 
Citibank, the United State Supreme Court upheld Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency regulations, which also preempted state 
laws concerning credit-card late fees.106 In essence, Marquette Na-
tional Bank left a landscape where no effective cap on annual interest 
was in place for national banks to charge on credit cards and other 
loans. 
In addition, usury statutes in many states exempt certain types of 
loans and lenders from their proscriptions on interest. Many states 
exclude loans to corporations and partnerships from the usury limita-
tions.107 Furthermore, lenders such as title-loan lenders are typically 
exempted from state usury laws as well.108 With Court decisions and 
exemptions, all that largely remain of state usury laws are the hollow 
shell of what the Founding Fathers would have intended. 
All of these developments, particularly the decisions of the Su-
preme Court in Marquette National Bank and Smiley, led to the rise of 
a new industry of lending — the payday loan industry. 
V. Catholic Legal Thought, Usury, and Payday Lending 
In the wake of Marquette National Bank and general deregulation 
of the banking industry in the 1980s, the payday loan industry started 
to flourish.109 Following Marquette National Bank, national banks 
could export the usury law of their home state nationwide.110 This 
loophole in the law permitted payday lenders to partner with the na-
tional banks operating in states with the least restrictive usury laws. 
Moreover, a number of states implemented specific payday loan stat-
 
 106. Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735 (1996). 
 107. Mann & Roberts, supra note 14. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Aimee Minnich, Rational Regulation of Payday Lending, 16 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 
84, 86 (2006). 
 110. Tasha Winebarger, Comment, The Beginning of the End: The Demise of Bank Partner-
ships with Payday Lenders, 7 N.C. Banking Inst. 317, 320–321 (2003) (“Once affiliated with 
these banks, payday lenders may charge their customers any interest rate allowed in the state of 
the bank, even if the customers reside in states having restrictive usury statutes. Thus, payday 
lenders circumvent state usury laws by forming partnerships with banks holding national char-
ters.”). 
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utes, which trumped general usury laws in applicability, and some 
states didn’t regulate the industry at all.111 
A. How a Payday Loan Works 
The typical payday loan is only a fourteen-day cash loan and the 
borrower writes a check to the payday lender for the amount bor-
rowed, plus the finance charge, until payday arrives.112 When payday 
arrives, the borrower has the option of either redeeming the check 
for cash, allowing the check to be deposited, or paying the finance 
charge and rolling the loan over to the next pay period, with an addi-
tional fee incurred.113 Annual percentage rates for this two-week 
credit range typically from 300% to over 700%.114 Unfortunately, 
this traps many borrowers in a debt trap where the amount of interest 
owed far outweighs the original amount of the loan. For example, 
consider the story of Dequae Woods, a single mother from Missouri. 
She reportedly paid over $1800 in interest on a loan that originally 
was for only $450.115 Stories like Ms. Woods’s are relatively com-
mon. According to a 2007 study conducted by the Center for Re-
sponsible Lending, 24% of payday loans go to borrowers with twen-
ty-one or more transactions per year.116 Borrowers then may fall into 
a “debt trap” where they procure another payday loan to try to pay 
off the previous loan, and the cycle continues. 
The dangers of falling into a “debt trap” are not the only poten-
tial downfalls for a payday loan borrower. The National Consumer 
Law Center has contended that the use of payday loans increases the 
chances of a borrower losing a bank account,117 increases bankruptcy 
 
 111. Id. at 319. 
 112. Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., Stopping the Payday Loan Trap: Alternatives 
that Work, One’s that Don’t 4 (Lauren K Saunders et al., eds., 2010), 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/payday_loans/report-stopping-payday-
trap.pdf. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Missouri Court Rules Against Payday Lender, Columbia Missourian (Jan. 1, 2009), 
http://www.columbiamissourian.com/stories/2009/01/01/mo-court-rules-against-kan-payday-
lender. 
 116. Uriah King & Leslie Parrish, Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Springing the 
Debt Trap: Rate Caps Are Only Proven Payday Lending Reform 3 (2007), 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/springing-the-debt-
trap.pdf. 
 117. Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 112, at 5, 56 n.14 (“One study found that 
an increase in the number of payday loan outlets in a county is associated with an 11% increase 
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filings,118 and causes financial hardships for families.119 In addition, 
payday lenders have targeted not only civilian families, but military 
ones as well. Military personnel and their families were targeted not 
only because of the steady paychecks they receive,120 but because 
many service members are young and unaware of the extreme finan-
cial risks of the loans.121 A 2005 estimate by the Center for Responsi-
ble Lending found that active-duty military personnel were three 
times more likely than civilians to procure a payday loan.122 With 
many calls for payday lending reform,123 a number of states and 
 
in involuntary bank account closures, even when other variables such as income and poverty 
rate are taken into account.” (citing Dennis Campbell, Asis Martinez Jerez, & Peter Tufano, 
Bouncing Out of the Banking System: An Empirical Analysis of Involuntary Bank Account Clo-
sures (June 6, 2008) (unpublished manuscript))). 
 118. Id. at 5, 56 n.15 (“In a large Texas study, researchers found that payday borrowers 
were about 88% more likely to file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the next two years than the 
rest of the Texas population.” (citing Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday 
Loans Cause Bankruptcy? (Nov. 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.vanderbilt 
.edu/faculty/facultypersonal-sites/paige-skiba/publication/download.aspx?id=2221)). 
 119. Id. at 5, 57 n.17 (“A University of Chicago Business School doctoral student com-
pared households in states with and without access to payday loans over a five year period and 
found that access to payday loans increases the chances a family will face hardship, have difficul-
ty paying bills, and have to delay medical care, dental care, and prescription drug purchases.” 
(citing Brian T. Melzer, The Real Costs of Credit Access: Evidence from the Payday Lending 
Market (Nov. 15, 2007) (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Chicago))). 
 120. See Shane Mendenhall, Note, Payday Loans: The Effects of Predatory Lending on Society 
and the Need for More State and Federal Regulation, 32 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 299, 323 (2007); 
Paul Fain, Payday Lenders Are on the Prowl!, InCharge, http://www.incharge.org/military-
money/ story/payday-lenders-are-on-the-prowl (last visited Jan. 28, 2013). 
 121. See Mendenhall, supra note 120, at 323 (“Payday lenders also target military person-
nel because many service members are young and financially inexperienced people unaware of 
the true costs of these loans. . . . Often, these people are receiving their first significant 
paycheck and are without the guidance or assistance of family. The military culture also stresses 
financial responsibility and even has policies explicitly stating that service members are to pay 
their just debts.” (footnotes omitted) (citing Mark Muecke, Consumers Union, Payday 
Lenders Burden Working Families and the U.S. Armed Forces 4 (2003), 
http://www.consumers union.org/pdf/payday-703.pdf)); see also U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Re-
port on Predatory Lending Practices Directed at Members of the Armed Forces 
and their Dependents 10 (2006), http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/report_to 
_congress_final.pdf. 
 122. Ozlem Tanik, Ctr. For Responsible Lending, Payday Lenders Target the 
Military 1 (2005), http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/ 
ip011-PaydayMilitary-0905.pdf. 
 123. Numerous law review articles have been written calling for various proposals of re-
form of the payday-lending industry. For articles published in the past 10 years and not cited 
elsewhere in this Article, see Carmen Butler, Mayday Payday: Can Corporate Social Responsibility 
Save Payday Lenders?, 3 Rutgers J. L. & Urb. Pol’y 119 (2006); Paul Chessin, Borrowing from 
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Congress took action in the wake of the growing number of stories of 
the payday loan debt trap to curb the most egregious lending abuses. 
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B. The Federal Government and States’ Response with Payday Regulation 
In response to the increasing number of stories where lenders 
were constantly churning one payday loan for another, the federal 
government took action to curb the most egregious practices. In 
March 2005, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation issued new 
regulations, which prohibited any lender from issuing any new pay-
day loans to a borrower who had payday loans outstanding from any 
lender for a total of more than 3 months in the previous 12 
months.124 In essence, the regulations prohibit any payday lender 
from “renewing” a payday loan with another loan more than six 
times.125 Congress also moved to curb the most egregious practices 
of payday lenders in 2006 with statutory protections for service 
members, including capping the annual interest rate on a payday loan 
to 36%.126 In addition, Congress also passed legislation requiring 
payday lenders make adequate disclosures of the annual percentage 
rate of the loan, strengthen disclosures already mandated under the 
Truth in Lending Act, and offer a “clear description of the payment 
obligations.”127 
States are also following the lead of the federal government in 
curtailing the excesses of the payday loan industry. Some states sub-
ject payday loans to a 36% APR interest rate cap128 and a number of 
others, including Arkansas, Arizona, the District of Columbia, Geor-
gia, and North Carolina, have prohibited them outright.129 
Critics of the payday lending system today have focused efforts at 
the state level at promoting legislation to place a 36% APR interest 
rate cap on payday loans.130 This proposal has the strong endorse-
ment of groups that represent the interests of borrowers, including 
 
 124. Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Analysis of FDIC’s Revised Examination 
Guidance for Payday Lending Programs (Mar. 14, 2005), http://www.responsiblelend 
ing.org/payday-lending/policy-legislation/regulators/pa-FDIC_Revised_Payday_Guidelines-
0305.pdf. 
 125. Id. 
 126. 10 U.S.C. § 987(b) (2012). 
 127. Dawn Goulet, Protecting Our Protectors: The Defense Department’s New Rules to Prevent 
Predatory Lending to Military Personnel, 20 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 81, 90 (2007). 
 128. Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 112, at 11. 
 129. Payday Lending Statutes, Nat’l Conf. on St. Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
issues-research/banking/payday-lending-state-statutes.aspx (last updated July 11, 2012). 
 130. Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 112, at 10. 
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the National Consumer Law Center.131 Legislation was proposed 
this year in several states, including Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, 
and Wisconsin to adopt the 36% cap.132 One of the most prominent 
entities supporting such legislation in the various states is the Catho-
lic Church. 
C. The Catholic Response to Payday Lending 
Of all forms of modern commercial lending, few (if any) come 
under as much criticism from the lens of the Catholic tradition as 
payday lending. The Catholic Church has also been one of the most 
vocal advocates for payday lending reform and for a 36% APR annual 
interest rate cap on payday loans. For example, the Catholic Confer-
ences of Texas,133 Kentucky, 134 Ohio,135 and Iowa136 have recently 
lobbied on behalf of such legislation. 
While Catholic prelates have strongly supported such legislation, 
direct connections between payday lending and usury have been 
made. For example, the Catholic Conference of Ohio has a separate 
webpage entitled Payday Lending.137 The website including a section 
entitled Catholic Teaching on Usury quotes from the Compendium of 
the Social Doctrine of the Church, which equates the excesses of usu-
 
 131. Id. at 11–12 (“The 36% rate cap also works on a practical level for the loans we are 
evaluating. For a loan that meets the criteria we propose for an affordable small loan—a 90-day 
minimum $300 installment loan carrying a 36% APR with fees—the borrower would have to 
pay about $48 every two weeks, including interest and a portion of the principal. That is virtu-
ally the same as the $45 fee that payday borrowers commonly now pay every two weeks to carry 
over a payday loan without making progress on the principal. Even $48 is a lot for someone 
living paycheck to paycheck, as most payday borrowers are. But the payments are realistic, un-
like the repayment schedule of a payday loan. For a borrower with a $35,000 annual income, 
$48 would account for less than 4% of after tax income every two weeks, an amount that is con-
ceivably within budget”). 
 132. Payday Lending 2012 Legislation, Nat’l Conf. on St. Legislatures, http://www. 
ncsl.org/issues-research/banking/payday-lending-2012-legislation.aspx (last updated July 11, 
2012). 
 133. Religious Leaders Call for Reform in Payday Lending Regulation, Tex. Cath. Conf. 
(Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.txcatholic.org/index.php/news/1066-religious-leaders-call-for-
reform-in-payday-lending-regulation. 
 134. Conference Supports Cap on Payday Loans, Cath. Conf. Ky. (Jan. 29, 2012), 
http://ccky.org/2012/01/conference-supports-cap-on-payday-loans. 
 135. Payday Lending, Cath. Conf. Ohio, http://www.ohiocathconf.org/i/EJ/payday.htm 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2013). 
 136. Iowa Catholic Conference Urges Legal Limits on Payday Loan Interest, Cath. News 
Agency (Jan. 6, 2010, 6:53 AM), http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/iowa_catholic_ 
conference_urges_legal_limits_on_payday_loan_interest. 
 137. Payday Lending, supra note 135. 
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ry to homicide. The Compendium states: “Although the quest for equi-
table profit is acceptable in economic and financial activity, recourse to usury 
is to be morally condemned: ‘Those whose usurious and avaricious deal-
ings lead to the hunger and death of their brethren in the human 
family indirectly commit homicide, which is imputable to them.’”138 
The excessive rates of over 36% APR of today’s modern payday 
lending lie contrary to the ideals of the Catholic tradition. This is es-
pecially true in the wake of the Church’s efforts in supporting legisla-
tion to cap APR interest rates on payday loans and Pope Benedict 
XVI’s call to protect the weak and vulnerable parties in society in 
Caritas in Veritate. Another form of modern financial usury, title-loan 
lending, also generally falls into this same category. 
VI. Catholic Legal Thought, Usury, and Title-Loan 
Lending 
A. How a Title Loan Works 
The legacy of the Marquette National Bank and Smiley decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court have also led to the growth of the 
title-loan industry. Title loans, also known as car-title loans, are loans 
in which a borrower places the title to their auto vehicle as collateral 
for a loan.139 The loan amounts may range anywhere from a few 
hundred dollars to several thousand dollars.140 While interest rates 
for title loans vary from state to state, in some jurisdictions a borrow-
er may be charged a 300% annual interest rate on the loan.141 Advo-
cates of the title-loan industry contend that in today’s difficult eco-
nomic climate, short-term title loans are a necessary form of credit 
for borrowers with bad credit scores or struggling small business 
 
 138. Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doc-
trine of the Church, at para. 341 (2005) (citing Catechism of the Catholic Church 
2269), available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/ docu-
ments/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html. 
 139. What are Car Title Loans?, Ctr. Responsible Lending, http://www.responsiblelen 
ding.org/other-consumer-loans/car-title-loans/tools-resources/what-are-car-title-loans.html 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2013). 
 140. Sue Kirchhoff, Some Consumers Run into Big Problems with Auto Title Lending, USA 
Today (Dec. 26, 2006), http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/general/2006-12-26-title-loans 
-usat_x.htm. 
 141. Id. 
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owners.142 Recent data from 2011 in at least one state, Virginia, 
shows the industry is booming. Nearly 380 car title lending locations 
in Virginia in 2011 offered out nearly 128,500 loans worth approxi-
mately $125 million dollars.143 
However, these loans can sometimes trap borrowers in a terrible 
cycle of debt, which can result in the loss of one of the most signifi-
cant assets often essential for economic well-being: a vehicle.144 For 
instance, Alicia and Clinton Lummus of Conyers, Georgia, took out 
a $525 loan in March 2006 after injuries allegedly prevented them 
from working.145 They reportedly placed a $14,000 automobile as 
collateral for the loan.146 After paying $132 for eight months, they 
reportedly did not make the monthly payment for the ninth 
month.147 The lender reportedly repossessed the vehicle—and in 
some jurisdictions, if a title-loan lender repossesses an automobile, 
they may keep the positive difference between the sale of the vehicle 
to another entity and the outstanding balance on the loan.148 Sup-
porters of the payday-loan and title-loan industries contend that 
these loans provide necessary access to short-term credit for consum-
ers,149 and that the majority of consumers are “middle class” Ameri-
cans and not the very poor.150 
A number of commentators, however, have scrutinized aspects of 
the title-loan lending industry because of the triple-digit interest 
rates incurred by borrowers and that many borrowers have to “rollo-
ver” a previous title loan into a “new” title loan and incur an addi-
tional loan fee.151 Recent empirical research has refuted the claim of 
 
 142. Michael Felberbaum, New Data Shows Car Title Loans Big Business in VA, Bus. Wk. 
(Jul. 6, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-07-06/new-data-shows-car-title-loans-
big-business-in-va. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Car Title Loans, Ams. Fairness Lending (Sept. 20, 2007), http://americansforfair 
nessinlending.wordpress.com/2007/09/20/car-title-loans. 
 145. Kirchhoff, supra note 140. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. About CFSA, Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass’n Am., http://cfsaa.com/about-cfsa.aspx (last 
visited Dec. 29, 2012). 
 150. Nathalie Martin & Ernesto Longa, High-Interest Loans and Class: Do Payday and Title 
Loans Really Serve the Middle Class?, 24 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 524, 529–30 (2012). 
 151. See Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services 
Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role of 
Usury Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. Rev. 589 (2000); Jean Ann Fox, Fringe Bankers: Eco-
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the title-loan industry that lenders rarely repossess the vehicles of 
borrowers who take out the loans.152 In a 2012 Missouri Law Review 
article, Professor Nathalie Martin and Ozymandias Adams concluded 
that as many as 71% of title-loan borrowers in New Mexico had their 
vehicles repossessed.153 With calls for title-loan-lending reform com-
ing from not only consumer groups but also legal scholars, a number 
of states have implemented title-loan-lending reform in the past sev-
eral years. 
B. The Response of States with Title-Loan-Lending Regulation 
Title-loan-lending regulation varies widely among jurisdictions. 
A number of states explicitly prohibit title-loan lending.154 However, 
there are approximately sixteen states that allow title loans to be 
placed in excess of a 100% APR interest rate,155 and four others that 
allow car title lending via a legislative loophole.156 Finally, several 
other states authorize title lending, but at lower rates.157 
 Florida is one such state that allows title-loan lending at lower 
rates. Chapter 687 of the Florida statutes regulates lending practices 
in the state generally, and its intention is to protect borrowers from 
 
nomic Predators or a New Financial Services Model?, 30 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 135 (2007); Jim 
Hawkins, Credit on Wheels: The Law and Business of Auto-Title Lending, 69 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
535, 604 (2012) (concluding that “states should enact laws specifically directed at title lending 
that preserve the equity borrowers have in their vehicles”); Leah A. Plunkett & Ana Lucía Hur-
tado, Small-Dollar Loans, Big Problems: How States Protect Consumers from Abuses and How the 
Federal Government Can Help, 44 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 31 (2011); Jessie Lundberg, Comment, 
Big Interest Rates Under the Big Sky: The Case for Payday and Title Lending Reform in Montana, 
68 Mont. L. Rev. 181 (2007).  
 152. Nathalie Martin & Ozymandias Adams, Grand Theft Auto Loans: Repossession and De-
mographic Realities in Title Lending, 77 Mo. L. Rev. 41 (2012). 
 153. Id. at 45. 
 154. Car Title Lending by State, Ctr. Responsible Lending, http://www.responsiblelen 
ding.org/other-consumer-loans/car-title-loans/tools-resources/car-title-lending-by-state.html 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2012). States that currently prohibit title-loan lending include Arkansas, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New 
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Is-
land, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
 155. Id. These states include Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Loui-
siana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, 
and Wisconsin. 
 156. Id. These four states include California, Kansas, South Carolina, and Texas. 
 157. Id. These states include Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, New Hamp-
shire, Oregon, and Vermont. 
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“paying unfair and excessive interest to overreaching creditors.”158 
There is a “tiered” system of interest rates on title loans in Florida. 
No title-loan lender is permitted to charge an annual interest rate of 
over 30% on the first $2000 of the principal loan amount, 24% on 
the part of the principal loan amount between $2000 and $3000, and 
18% on the part of the principal loan amount exceeding $3000.159 
The strongest aspect of Florida’s law is the provision stating that 
intentional violations of the title-loan statute may result in criminal 
liability. If a title-loan lender intentionally violates the interest rate 
provisions and charges interest at an annual rate exceeding 45%, that 
lender could be guilty of a third degree felony.160 In addition, repeat-
ed violations of the title-loan provisions could form the basis of a 
state criminal racketeering prosecution.161 These criminal sanctions 
serve as strong deterrents to the worst aspects of modern usury and 
loansharking.162 
Despite the absence of extensive regulation of the title-loan in-
dustry in many states, the recent trend is for states to implement 
more regulation to curb the excesses of the industry. Some states 
where the industry was once active, such as Wisconsin, have recently 
prohibited the practice.163 Between 2007 and 2010, at least six states 
implemented new regulation of the industry.164 As in the case of pay-
day loans, Catholic leaders have called for greater regulation of the 
title-loan industry. 
C. The Catholic Response to Title-Loan Lending 
In a response similar to that taken towards payday loans, Catholic 
bishops have actively lobbied for title-loan-lending reform at the 
state level. In particular, Bishop Joe Vásquez of the Diocese of Aus-
tin, Texas has been a prominent leader in the movement to reform 
 
 158. Fla. Op. Att’y Gen., Title Loan Transactions 99-38 (1999). 
 159. Fla. Stat. § 537.011(1) (2012). 
 160. Id. § 687.071(3). 
 161. Fla. Op. Att’y Gen., supra note 158. 
 162. Christopher L. Peterson, Only Until Payday: A Primer on Utah’s Growing Deferred 
Deposits Loan Industry, 15 Utah B.J. 16 (2002) (“The term ‘loanshark’ originated toward the 
end of the nineteenth century to describe lenders who sold credit secured by borrowers’ future 
wages.”). 
 163. Sudeep Reddy, States to Protect Borrowers Who Turn to Cars for Cash, Wall St. J.  
(Jul. 19, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487047468045753672507839439 
06.html. 
 164. Id. 
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title-loan lending in Texas. In testimony before the Texas Legislature 
in 2011, he called for the body to reform a Texas loophole that allows 
title-loan lenders to be classified as a “credit service organization” ra-
ther than as a lender.165 The loophole allows Texas title-loan “credit 
service organizations” to charge triple-digit interest rates. 
In his testimony, Bishop Vásquez emphasized that Catholic social 
teaching requires three key things: first, “respect for the dignity of 
persons”; second, “preferential concern for the poor and vulnerable”; 
and finally, “pursuit of the common good.”166 Bishop Vásquez noted 
that title-loan lenders were doing “more harm than good for persons 
in need of short-term cash loans”167 and that nearly 20% of the indi-
viduals who utilized financial assistance programs through Catholic 
charities in his Diocese in 2010 had used payday and title loans.168 
He expressed the concern that the Catholic Church’s charitable dol-
lars were unfortunately providing de facto funding for lenders, rather 
than aid genuinely aimed at helping the poor achieve self-
sufficiency.169 
Just as with payday loans, auto-title loans with triple digit rates of 
interest impede the opportunities for individuals to gain economic 
self-sufficiency. One of the key themes of Caritas in Veritate is the call 
of Pope Benedict XVI for financial instruments to be used in an “eth-
ical way so as to create suitable conditions for human development 
and for the development of peoples.”170 Title-loan lending at triple 
digit rates of interest, however, only impedes authentic human devel-
opment. In the wake of payday lending and title-loan lending at ex-
cessive rates of interest, Catholic legal thought challenges these 
forms of modern usury today. 
 
 165. Tex. Catholic Conference, Testimony of Bishop Joe Vásquez Before the Senate 
Business and Commerce Committee (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/Senate/ 
commit/c510/handouts11/0223-BishopJoeVasquez.pdf. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Caritas in Veritate, supra note 23, at para. 145. 
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VII. The Role of Catholic Legal Thought in 
Challenging Modern Usury 
A. The Unconscionability Doctrine 
This article has thus far focused on federal and state efforts to 
curb the excesses of modern usury. But in today’s complex world, 
where redress to the courts is available in this country, the purposes 
and intention of the Catholic legal tradition in the usury debate today 
can best be upheld in the courts by vigorous enforcement and adher-
ence to the unconscionability doctrine of contract law. The uncon-
scionability doctrine best exemplifies the tenets of Catholic social and 
economic thought in three significant areas: the focus of unconscion-
ability and Catholic economic thought on per-se rates of interest, the 
significance of the disclosure of key material terms, and finally, the 
importance of meaningful choice in a bargain and thus, allowing a 
more vulnerable party a meaningful alternative to usury. 
1. A background of the unconscionability doctrine 
The past fifty years of contract law have seen a recognition by the 
courts that certain contractual bargains are grossly unfair and/or 
shocking to the dictates of conscience.171 The doctrine of uncon-
scionability has become a mechanism by which the courts can merge 
equitable considerations into the law and prevent specific perfor-
mance of unconscionable contracts.172 In essence, the doctrine seeks 
to prevent two things—oppression and unfair surprise.173 The un-
conscionability doctrine has been applied not only to standard con-
tracts of adhesion, but also to transactions where the parties theoreti-
cally have the ability to discuss the terms of the agreement.174 The 
classic articulation of the doctrine was pronounced by the United 
 
 171. Rougeau, supra note 22, at 129–30. 
 172. Joseph M. Perillo, Calamari and Perillo on Contracts 384–85 (5th ed. 2003). 
 173. Id. at 388. 
 174. Perillo lists a number of situations in which the unconscionability doctrine has been 
applied: 
cases involving a contract to construct asphalt plants, home improvement contracts, 
equipment leases, real estate brokerage contracts, hiring a hall for a Bar Mitzvah, a 
contract opening a checking account, an apartment house lease, a release, a contract 
for a motion picture idea, an arbitration provision in a contract of employment, a se-
curity transaction, a filling station lease, the settlement of a will contest dispute, and, 
coming full circle to its equitable origins, to a problem relating to a spendthrift trust. 
Id. at 385–86. 
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States District Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in the 
Williams v. Walker-Thomas case, which invalidated several contracts 
for household items purchased by two individuals between 1957 and 
1962 on the basis of unconscionability.175 
Significantly, the court described unconscionability in the follow-
ing terms: 
Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an ab-
sence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties togeth-
er with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the oth-
er party. Whether a meaningful choice is present in a particular case 
can only be determined by consideration of all the circumstances 
surrounding the transaction. In many cases the meaningfulness of 
the choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power. The 
manner in which the contract was entered is also relevant to this 
consideration. Did each party to the contract, considering his obvi-
ous education or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to under-
stand the terms of the contract, or were the important terms hidden 
in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices? 
Ordinarily, one who signs an agreement without full knowledge of 
its terms might be held to assume the risk that he has entered a one-
sided bargain. But when a party of little bargaining power, and 
hence little real choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract 
with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his 
consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent, was ever 
given to all the terms. In such a case the usual rule that the terms of 
the agreement are not to be questioned should be abandoned and 
the court should consider whether the terms of the contract are so 
unfair that enforcement should be withheld.176 
Modern unconscionability doctrine categorizes unconscionability 
into two forms—procedural and substantive unconscionability.177 
Substantive unconscionability refers to the actual terms and provi-
sions of a contract178 and whether they are substantively oppressive as 
 
 175. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
 176. Id. at 449–50. 
 177. For an extensive discussion of the unconscionability doctrine today and its applica-
tion in court cases, see Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconsciona-
bility: An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1067 (2006). 
 178. Mann & Roberts, supra note 14, at 236 (“Substantive unconscionability, which in-
volves the actual terms of the contract, consists of oppressive or grossly unfair provisions, such 
as an exorbitant price or an unfair exclusion or limitation of contractual remedies.”). 
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a matter of law.179 In contrast, procedural unconscionability, or “bar-
gain naughtiness,” refers to the surprise element180 and the procedur-
al facts surrounding the transaction.181 Jurisdictions are split as to 
whether evidence of both procedural and substantive unconscionabil-
ity are required to rescind a contract, although courts have rescinded 
a contract on the basis of substantive unconscionability alone.182 
In essence, similar to the goals of Catholic social teaching, the 
purpose of the unconscionability doctrine is to protect the weakest 
and most vulnerable in society. It is currently an open legal question 
as to whether excessive interest rates are per se substantively uncon-
scionable.183  
2. Annual interest rates and per se unconscionability 
First, Catholic social teaching and Caritas in Veritate emphasize 
not only the need for protection of the most weak and vulnerable in 
society, but respect for the universal common good and a commit-
ment to security and justice for all to obtain authentic integral human 
development.184 With regard to modern usury, particularly payday 
lending, the main concern of Catholic social teaching is not only that 
payday lending has recognized harmful social effects, but prevents the 
proper economic development of the human person. The presence of 
the “debt trap” certainly prohibits this development and excessive 
rates of interest contribute to the debt cycle. 
The unconscionability doctrine can serve a role in preventing 
lenders from charging egregious interest rates. The position of many 
Catholic conferences with regards to APRs is that a rate in excess of 
thirty-six percent APR is usurious and unconscionable.185 In Carboni 
 
 179. Perillo, supra note 172, at 381. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Mann & Roberts, supra note 14, at 236 (“Procedural unconscionability involves 
scrutiny for the presence of ‘bargaining naughtiness.’ In other words, was the negotiation pro-
cess fair, or were there procedural irregularities, such as burying important terms of the agree-
ment in fine print or obscuring the true meaning of the contract with impenetrable legal jar-
gon.”). 
 182. Perillo, supra note 172, at 381. 
 183. See, e.g., Payday Loan Store of Wis., Inc. v. Mount, No. 2010AP2298, 2011 WL 
2577365 (Wis. Ct. App. June 30, 2011). The Wisconsin Supreme Court will soon decide the 
question whether an annual interest rate in excess of 1000% per annum for a short-term loan is 
per se unconscionable under the Wisconsin Consumer Act. 
 184. See Caritas in Veritate, supra note 23, at para. 67. 
 185. See supra notes 133–36. 
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v. Arrospide, a California appellate court found that a 200% interest 
rate on a secured $99,000 loan was substantively unconscionable.186 
The court acknowledged the difficulty that courts find with regard to 
the point at which unconscionability is reached187—thirty-six per-
cent, which is suggested by the Center for Responsible Lending and 
many Catholic organizations, serves as a reasonable point, especially 
considering the court in Carboni reduced the permissible rate of in-
terest for collection from 200% to 24%.188 
3. Disclosure of key terms and unconscionability 
In today’s contract world, disclosure of key terms to both parties 
is an essential requirement of a proper meeting of the minds. Before 
any advent of the unconscionability doctrine, Catholic social teaching 
emphasized the importance of disclosing key contractual terms. In 
the 1745 encyclical Vix Pervenit, Pope Benedict XIV wrote that banks 
and lenders must make certain disclosures in their lending agree-
ments. Pope Benedict XIV stated that, within the contract, lenders 
“should explain the conditions and what gain they expect from their 
money. This will not only greatly help to avoid concern and anxiety, 
but will also confirm the contract in the realm of public business.”189 
Similar to the requirements of Catholic social teaching, disclo-
sure of key terms is essential in the unconscionability inquiry. In a 
number of situations, a party may not receive full disclosure of key 
material terms or facts, or a party may take advantage of another par-
ty in a more vulnerable position. For instance, in Frostifresh v. Reyno-
so, a Spanish-speaking person was persuaded to pay $1145.88 for a 
$348 appliance on an installment contract.190 The New York Court 
of Appeals held the contract to be unconscionable.191 In a more re-
cent case involving payday lending, the Missouri Court of Appeals 
held that a class action waiver provision in a payday loan contract was 
both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.192 Part of the 
 
 186. Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845, 850 (Ct. App. 1991). 
 187. Id. at 848 (“Although it is a simple matter to say that at some point an interest rate 
becomes unconscionable, it is more difficult to determine when that point is reached.”). 
 188. See id. at 847. 
 189. Vix Pervenit, supra note 81, at 9. 
 190. Frostifresh v. Reynoso, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. Div. 1967). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Woods v. QC Fin. Servs., Inc., 280 S.W.3d 90, 96, 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008). 
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court’s ruling hinged on disclosure of key terms—the payday loan 
contract was in such fine print that even an optical scanner was una-
ble to make out some of the characters.193 
4. The absence of meaningful choice and unconscionability 
Finally, Catholic social teaching also requires that a just contract 
is one in which all opportunities for lawful gain are investigated. In 
Vix Pervenit, Pope Benedict XIV wrote that in some circumstances 
“no other true and just contract may be possible except for a loan. 
Whoever therefore wishes to follow his conscience must first dili-
gently inquire if, along with the loan, another category exists by 
means of which the gain he seeks may be lawfully attained.”194 Thus, 
the option of rational choice of financial products must be made 
available to borrowers. 
Catholic social teaching and the unconscionability doctrine simi-
larly protect economic choice in the free market economy. Contract 
law is not lacking of examples where a court has invalidated a con-
tractual provision—or an entire contract—when the terms were of-
fered on a “take it or leave it” basis, offering no meaningful choice for 
one of the contractual parties.195 Thus, the unconscionability doc-
trine of contract law protects the very essence of economic choice by 
invalidating agreements that lack a meaningful choice for participants 
in the marketplace. 
B. Conclusion—Catholic Social Teaching and the Unconscionability 
Doctrine 
Catholic social teaching and the prevention of modern usury is 
best reflected today by vigorous adherence and application of the un-
conscionability doctrine. Pursuant to Catholic social teaching, an in-
terest rate in excess of a thirty-six percent APR is per se unconsciona-
ble.196 In addition, Catholic social teaching demands disclosure of 
key material contractual terms and the opportunity for meaningful 
 
 193. Id. at 96 (“Respondent’s expert testified that the spacing of the lines in the clause 
were so close that words from adjacent lines touched and an optical scanner was unable to make 
out the characters. The clause contains more than 1,300 words made to fit onto one page. 
When presented in a double-spaced, 12 point Times New Roman font, which is how this opin-
ion is presented, the clause is six pages long.”). 
 194. Vix Pervenit, supra note 81, at para. 3-V. 
 195. See Perillo, supra note 172, at 390 (citing cases). 
 196. See supra notes 133–36. 
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choice of lending options, both of which are protected by the uncon-
scionability doctrine.197 In a time when there is tension between 
some aspects of traditional contract law and Catholic social teaching, 
the unconscionability doctrine serves to protect all participants in the 
marketplace. Along with the unconscionability doctrine, community 
credit unions and microcredit programs today also present strong 
economic choices for participants in the economy to avoid the debt 
traps of modern usury. 
VIII. Community Credit Unions and Microfinance 
Programs as Alternatives to Modern Usury 
Catholic legal and intellectual thought today is not only critical of 
the excesses of modern usury with payday loans and title loans, it also 
offers alternatives for moral participation in the modern economy: 
community credit unions and microfinance programs. In Caritas in 
Veritate, Pope Benedict XVI stated that credit unions are a contem-
porary illustration of institutions grounded with an “ethical founda-
tion” that have the right intention and transparency.198 
Credit unions are defined particularly as cooperative financial in-
stitutions that are primarily “based on thrift that are directed at ful-
filling human and social needs.”199 Significantly, credit unions also 
have a democratic form and a not-for-profit ownership structure.200 
Microfinance programs are also similar to credit unions in that the 
programs are intended to provide financial services (such as lending) 
“to the poor on a sustainable basis.”201 
The mission of community development credit unions, in partic-
ular, is to serve low and moderate-income individuals and families.202 
They generally offer low interest loans to members, often without a 
credit history requirement, and provide members with financial edu-
 
 197. Cf. Vix Pervenit, supra note 81, at para. 3-V. 
 198. Caritas in Veritate, supra note 23, at para. 65. 
 199. Charles Ferguson & Donal McKillop, The Strategic Development of 
Credit Unions 15 (1997). 
 200. See Reed White, Comment, If It Quacks Like a Duck: In Light of Today’s Financial En-
vironment, Should Credit Unions Continue to Enjoy Tax Exemptions?, 28 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1367, 
1379 (2012). 
 201. Bernd Balkenhol, Efficiency and Sustainability in Microfinance, in Microfinance and 
Public Policy 3, 3 (Bernd Balkenhol, ed., 2007). 
 202. What Is a CDCU?, Cmty. Dev. Credit Union Fed’n, http://www.cdcu.coop/ 
i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=261 (last visited Jan. 28, 2013). 
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cation and counseling.203 In a world of payday and title-loan lenders, 
community development credit unions offer a real alternative for 
low- and moderate-income borrowers who may otherwise be caught 
in the payday or title-loan debt trap. 
With their provision of low interest rates, it is not surprising that 
Pope Benedict XVI applauds the work of credit unions and micro-
finance programs in today’s economy.204 One particular loan pro-
gram in Belleville, Illinois, began as a collaboration between St. Vin-
cent de Paul conferences and the Catholic and Community Credit 
Union and serves as a great illustration of the spirit of Caritas in Veri-
tate. The founders of the loan program reached out to St. Vincent de 
Paul conferences and the Catholic and Community Credit Union for 
donations and guidance in program implementation.205 If a potential 
borrower’s application for a loan is approved, the borrower is given a 
$300 loan from the $15,000 fund of the program and is only charged 
a 3% interest rate on the loan.206 Borrowers participate in a budget-
ing class, where they are taught money-saving techniques, and once 
they complete the class they receive a $5 grocery store gift card.207 
The program is a unique one among the approximately 257 faith-
affiliated credit unions as of 2009, of which approximately fifty-eight 
are Catholic-affiliated.208 
Along with involvement in the debates over payday and title-
loan-lending reform, Catholic social activism is making a positive dif-
ference for borrowers through community credit unions and micro-
finance lending programs. 
IX. Conclusion 
In an era of increasing financial complexity, the Catholic legal 
and intellectual tradition offers not only a symbolic moral witness to 
the policy debates concerning lending, but a voice that offers real so-
lutions to the problem of modern usury. The duty of those in the 
economic world to safeguard the weaker, more vulnerable parties in 
society as articulated by Pope Benedict XVI in Caritas in Veritate can 
 
 203. Id. 
 204. Caritas in Veritate, supra note 23, at para. 65. 
 205. Tom Gallagher, An Alternative to Payday Loans for the Working Poor, Nat’l Cath. 
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best find its expression in vigorous adherence to the unconscionabil-
ity doctrine of contract law. In addition, the Catholic legal and intel-
lectual tradition promotes microcredit lending programs and com-
munity credit unions as strong economic alternatives to modern 
usury. 
In conclusion, perhaps one of the greatest contributions of the 
Catholic legal and intellectual tradition to the discussion concerning 
modern usury lies in the nature of the tradition itself as a tradition 
that emphasizes the universal common good in commerce. The tradi-
tion is reflected in the words of a popular song: “Whatsoever you do 
for the least of My people That you do unto Me.”209 Modern law and 
policy concerning usury can and should reflect this ideal. 
  
 
 209. Whatsoever You Do, Our Lady of Sorrows Church, 
http://www.ourladyofsorrows.us/Music_Lyrics/Lyrics/Whatsoever_You_Do.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 29, 2012); see also Matthew 25: 40. 
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Table 1 (Appendix): Current State Usury Limits210 
State Usury-Limit Statute Current Usury Limit 
Alabama Ala. Code § 8-8-1 8% 
Alaska Alaska Stat. § 45.45.010 10.5% 
Arizona 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.  
§ 44-1201 
10% 
Arkansas Ark. Const. Amend. 89, § 3 
17% (consumer loans); 5% above 
the Federal Reserve Bank Discount 
Rate (non-consumer loans) 
California Cal. Const. Art. 15, § 1 
10% (consumer loans); 5% above 
the Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco Discount Rate (non-
consumer loans) 
Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. § 5-12-101 8% 
Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-1 12% 
Delaware Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 2301 
5% above the Federal Reserve Bank 
Discount Rate 
District of  
Columbia 
D.C. Code § 28-3301 24% 
Florida Fla. Stat. § 687.02 
18% (loans smaller than $500,000); 
25% (loans greater than $500,000) 
Georgia Ga. Code Ann. § 7-4-2 
16% (loans $3000 or less); 60% 
(loans between $3000 and 
$250,000) 
Hawaii Haw. Rev. Stat. § 478-2 10% 
Idaho No usury statute found N/A 
Illinois 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 205/4 9% 
Indiana Ind. Code § 24-4.5-3-201 
21% (loans $50,000 or less); no 
maximum rate (loans over $50,000) 
Iowa Iowa Code § 535.2 5% 
Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. § 16-207 15% 
Kentucky 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 360.010(1) 
Rate for loans under $15,000 is the 
lesser of either 19% or 4% above 
the Federal Reserve Bank Discount 
Rate; there is no maximum rate for 
loans over $15,000 
Louisiana La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:3503 12% 
Maine No usury statute found N/A
Maryland 
Md. Code Ann., Com. Law
§ 12-103
8% 
 
 210. The information in this table was compiled after a Westlaw search of all applicable 
state usury limits. A search was conducted after review of the following website, which should 
receive due credit: Usury Laws by State, LoanBack (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.loanback. 
com/category/usury-laws-by-state. 
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State Usury-Limit Statute Current Usury Limit 
Massachusetts 
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
ch. 271, § 49 
20% 
Michigan 
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 438.31 
7% 
Minnesota Minn. Stat. Ann. § 334.03 8% 
Mississippi Miss. Code Ann. § 75-17-1 
Rate is the greater of either 10% or 
5% above the Federal Reserve Bank 
Discount Rate 
Missouri Mo. Ann. Stat. § 408.030 
Rate is the greater of 10%, or 3% 
above long-term U.S. government 
bond yields  
Montana Mont. Code Ann. § 31-1-107 
Rate is the greater of 15% or “6 
percentage points per year above 
the prime rate published by the fed-
eral reserve system in its statistical 
release H.15 Selected Interest Rates 
for bank prime loans dated 3 busi-
ness days prior to the execution of 
the agreement” 
Nebraska Neb. Rev. Stat. § 45-101.03 16% 
Nevada No usury statute found N/A 
New Hampshire No usury statute found N/A 
New Jersey N.J. Stat. Ann. § 31:1-1 16% 
New Mexico No usury statute found N/A 
New York 
N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law
§ 5-501 
16% 
North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-1.1 
Rate for loans under $25,000 is the 
greater of either 16% or 6% above 
the 6 month U.S. Treasury bills 
rate. There is no maximum rate for 
loans over $25,000 
North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code § 47-14-05 
Rate for loans under $35,000 5.5% 
above the 6 month U.S. Treasury 
bills rate. There is no maximum 
rate for loans over $35,000 
Ohio 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 1343.01 
Rate for loans under $100,000 is 
8%. There is no maximum rate for 
loans over $100,000 
Oklahoma 
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 14A,  
§ 3-201 
10% 
Oregon Or. Rev. Stat. § 82.010 
Rate for loans under $50,000 is the 
greater of either 12% or 5% above 
the Federal Reserve Discount Rate  
Pennsylvania 41 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 201 
Rate for loans under $50,000 is 6%. 
There is no maximum rate for loans 
over $50,000 
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State Usury-Limit Statute Current Usury Limit 
Rhode Island R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-26-2 
Rate is either the greater of 21% or 
9% above “the domestic prime rate 
as published in the Money Rates 
section of The Wall Street Journal 
on the last business day of each 
month preceding the later of the 
date of the debtor’s agreement or 
the date on which the interest is 
redetermined in accordance with 
the terms of the debtor’s agree-
ment” 
South Carolina S.C. Code Ann. § 34-31-20 8.75% 
South Dakota No usury statute found N/A 
Tennessee 
Tenn. Code Ann.  
§ 47-14-103  
Rate is either the lesser of either 
24% or 4% of the Federal Reserve 
Bank Prime Rate 
Texas 
Tex. Fin. Code Ann.
§ 302.001 
10% 
Utah Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 
10% (but parties can contract for a 
different rate, higher or lower) 
Vermont Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 41a 12% 
Virginia Va. Code Ann. § 6.2-303 12% 
Washington 
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 19.52.020  
Rate is either the greater of 12% or 
4% above “the equivalent coupon 
issue yield (as published by the 
Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System) of the average bill 
rate for twenty-six week treasury 
bills as determined at the first bill 
market auction conducted during 
the calendar month immediately 
preceding the later of (i) the estab-
lishment of the interest rate by 
written agreement permitting an 
adjustment in the interest rate, or 
(ii) any adjustment in the interest 
rate in the case of a written agree-
ment permitting an adjustment in 
the interest rate” 
West Virginia W. Va. Code Ann. § 47-6-5 8% 
Wisconsin Wis. Stat. Ann. § 138.04 5% 
Wyoming Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-14-106 7% 
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